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Since the onset of the sovereign debt crisis, Switzerland has received a great deal of attention and applause for its sound fiscal policy. Partly in deference to this, the Financial Times recently extolled Switzerland as "an alpine peak the Eurozone can only aspire to," implying that the Swiss way of doing things is admirably effective but hard for others to emulate, thereby reinforcing the notion of Swiss exceptionalism.
It is unsurprising that the issue makes headlines at a time when sovereign debt is being reassessed by policymakers (and financial markets) around the world. When a formal process to enforce fiscal discipline at the Swiss federal level was introduced in 2003, it was largely ignored by foreign observers. This may be because Switzerland has always been assumed to be fiscally disciplined. Furthermore, as in most Western democracies, national debt was a relatively small agenda point in the latter half of the 20th century. This was thanks to steady economic growth on a global scale and, following the dotcom bust, loose central bank policies coupled with growing capital flows from emerging markets (especially China) into the developed world.
Although this trend has been generally true for the last two decades, Switzerland experienced phases of deteriorating debt dynamics in the interim. In the early 1990s, the economy entered a prolonged period of weak economic growth, trailing the growth rates of the EU for several years. Deficits accumulated rapidly owing to increases in social security expenditures and all kind of subsidies, resulting in aggregate national debt of CHF 206 billion, or 50 percent of GDP in 2001. In that year, Swiss citizens approved, with an overwhelming majority of 85 percent, a constitutional amendment to maintain a balanced budget. Since coming into force in 2003, the so called "debt brake" has led to an impressive turnaround in public finances. A balanced budget was achieved in 2005 and followed by budget surpluses in subsequent years, reducing the debt quota to 40 percent. Swiss public debt is expected to fall to 36 percent in fiscal year 2011.
The practical success of the debt brake has triggered a remarkable following. Germany adopted a similar provision in 2009, and successfully pushed for the introduction of enforceable balanced budget rules in the national constitutions of Eurozone member states during the EU summit in December 2011. In spite of the proverbial Swiss exceptionalism, the debt brake has gained a broad following among governments facing unsustainable fiscal situations. Given the record high US national debt and the political impasse around the raising of the debt ceiling, it is only natural to turn to the experiences and budgeting instruments of a fiscally prudent country. Although such experiences cannot be replicated in a different political-economic setting, they may nevertheless inspire the current debate in the US.
Needless to say, however, a debt brake is no panacea for the challenges affecting indebted nations today. Fiscal discipline may be an effective tool against unbridled deficits, and can contribute to stabilizing and reducing national debt. However, it is neither a substitute for productivity and growth, nor for a sound economic policy. What the debt brake aims to alleviate is the inherent asymmetry of discretionary fiscal policy, where the revenue side varies with economic growth and the business cycle, while the expenditure side is the outcome of a parliamentary bargaining process. This usually results in continued spending during a recession and a lack of fiscal restraint during economic expansions.
It is also important to stress that the Swiss debt brake is a pragmatic measure to avoid an uncontrolled growth of federal and/or cantonal debt. It was not borne out of an ideological notion that the state should never incur debts; that is, government debt has no normative dimension. According to the principle of Ricardian equivalence, sovereign debts are essentially deferred taxes with no net stimulus effect. The relevant economic policy issue is not so much debt per se, but the proportion of public sector expenditures over GDP and the question whether budget deficits are structural or not.
The Long Shadow of Debt
The radical position that public debt must be avoided at almost all costs seems incompatible with the functioning of modern capital markets and with global trade. Government bonds were instrumental for the growth and integration of international capital markets by improving financial intermediation and providing benchmark rates for virtually all fixed-income securities and private sector lending. The temporal transformation of risks, which is at the core of the contractual savings sector (pension schemes and life insurers), requires the
